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The Origin of Citizen Genet’s Projected Attack on  
Spanish Louisiana: A Case Study in Girondin Politics
Wesley J. Campbell
Abstract In 1792 the Girondin ministry decided to send Edmond Genet to the United States with plans to 
recruit western frontiersmen and invade Spanish Louisiana. The episode is well known in American history, but 
the literature on its French origin is sparse and overemphasizes the contribution of revolutionary leader Jacques-
Pierre Brissot. This essay contextualizes the French decision within the debate between Brissot, Minister of For-
eign Affairs Pierre Lebrun, and General Charles-François Dumouriez over whether France should send troops 
against Spanish colonies in South America. The essay argues that Lebrun promoted the western scheme in order 
to attack Spanish interests without straining French resources. Rather than merely embodying a spirit of univer-
sal freedom, Lebrun’s plan was grounded in the geopolitical advantages the mission might afford France in its 
European wars.
Sailing from the French coast in February 1793 as the newly appointed 
minister to the United States, Edmond-Charles-Edouard Genet carried 
instructions to recruit American frontiersmen for an attack on Spanish 
Louisiana. Genet was to send French agents to Kentucky where they 
would organize an expedition to descend the Mississippi River and 
invade Spanish territory. This furtive mission, French leaders hoped, 
would “open to the people of Kentucky the navigation of the Missis-
sippi [and] deliver our ancient brothers of Louisiana from the tyran-
nical yoke of Spain.”1 Along with Genet’s commissioning of privateers 
out of American ports and his attempts to undermine public support 
for President Washington, the French scheme succeeded only in gener-
ating an American outcry against France’s audacious interventionism.
 Genet’s expedition and its effects in the United States have been 
well recorded, but study of the plan’s French origin has remained 
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1 Frederick Jackson Turner, “Correspondence of the French Ministers to the United States, 
1791–1797,” in Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1903, 2 vols. (Washing-
ton, DC, 1904), 2:204.
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scant.2 In an article published at the close of the nineteenth century, 
Frederick Jackson Turner argues that the malfeasances of Genet’s mis-
sion to the United States resulted from ideologically motivated French 
policies—not merely Genet’s own ambitious personality. The French 
scheme to recruit American frontiersmen for an invasion of Louisiana, 
according to Turner, was “part of the same enthusiastic crusade for lib-
erty that carried the French armies across the European frontiers in 
the early days of the Revolution.”3 Turner cites the writings of Jacques-
Pierre Brissot,4 one of the leaders of the loosely affiliated Girondin (or 
Brissotin) faction in the French National Convention,5 to show French 
familiarity with and interest in Spanish Louisiana. Brissot’s proclama-
tions in support of worldwide liberation are offered as evidence of the 
Girondins’ revolutionary intentions. Turner also lists several prominent 
Americans in Paris, some of whom had connections with the French 
government, and argues they might have had a role in promoting the 
French designs. Turner’s article continues to be cited as the princi-
pal authority on the origin of Genet’s western intrigues.6 His primary 
thesis, however, is limited to showing that Genet’s schemes were sanc-
tioned by the French government.
 Since the publication of Turner’s seminal article, scholars have 
almost unanimously accepted that French plans for a frontier revolt 
were the product of Brissot’s ideological commitment to spreading the 
Revolution abroad. Maude Howlett Woodfin states, “Brissot, with his 
flaming zeal for liberty that would plant its banner over all mankind 
and free them wherever they were in chains, was at the height of his 
power in this autumn of 1792.”7 Harry Ammon writes that “Girondin 
American policy was formulated at a moment when French leaders were 
2 For histories of the Genet affair and its political effects, see Harry Ammon, The Genet Mis-
sion (New York, 1973); Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism: The Early American 
Republic, 1788–1800 (Oxford, 1993), 330–73; Harry Ammon, “The Genet Mission and the Devel-
opment of American Political Parties,” Journal of American History 52 (1966): 725–41; and Eugene R. 
Sheridan, “The Recall of Edmond Charles Genet: A Study in Transatlantic Politics and Diplo-
macy,” Diplomatic History 18 (1994): 463–88.
3 Frederick Jackson Turner, “The Origin of Genet’s Projected Attack on Louisiana and the 
Floridas,” American Historical Review 3 (1898): 650.
4 Before the French Revolution, he called himself Brissot de Warville. See Frederick A. de 
Luna, “The Dean Street Style of Revolution: J.-P. Brissot, Jeune Philosophe,” French Historical Studies 
17 (1991): 162.
5 Contemporaries—primarily the Montagnard opposition—used the term Girondins to 
refer to Brissot and his allies, many of whom represented the Gironde department in southwest-
ern France. It is used here with some hesitation and with recognition that the Girondins were not 
a homogeneous group. See Frederick A. de Luna, “The ‘Girondins’ Were Girondins, After All,” 
French Historical Studies 15 (1988): 506–18.
6 See, e.g., François Furstenberg, “The Significance of the Trans-Appalachian Frontier in 
Atlantic History,” American Historical Review 113 (2008): 667. Ammon states that Turner’s “masterly 
article has not been supplanted” (Genet Mission, 184).
7 Maude Howlett Woodfin, “Citizen Genet and His Mission” (PhD diss., University of Chi-
cago, 1928), 65. Though heavily cited by later historians, Woodfin’s paper includes numerous 
errors and should be treated with caution.
GENET’S PROJECTED ATTACK ON SPANISH LOUISIANA 517
entranced by an ecstatic vision of the approaching worldwide revolu-
tion which would establish republican governments for all nations.”8 
Linda Frey and Marsha Frey assert that “the French revolutionaries 
indeed saw themselves as soldiers fighting for a cause and thought they 
were not bound by the constraints of traditional diplomacy.”9
 On the surface, evidence for Brissot’s orchestration of an ideo-
logically driven foreign policy is quite appealing. Brissot’s rhetorical 
proclamations fit nicely with the plan to free Louisiana from Span-
ish tyranny. His relative expertise in American affairs and ostensible 
leadership of the Girondins add further reason to assume his direction 
of the Genet mission. The Executive Council even notified Genet of his 
appointment on November 19—the same day the National Convention 
famously pledged French support for oppressed persons everywhere. 
Nevertheless, historians should be skeptical that Brissot’s ideas accu-
rately represent French thinking.
 Primary evidence suggests that Genet’s western schemes were 
coordinated by Minister of Foreign Affairs Pierre Lebrun—not Bris-
sot.10 Though guided in part by the ideological aims of the Revolu-
tion, Lebrun’s planning reflects pragmatism, a keen interest in Euro-
pean power politics, and a detailed knowledge of American affairs. 
Documents in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the correspondence 
of Girondin leaders also suggest that political conditions—including 
not only the growing rift between the Girondins and Montagnards but 
also disagreements among the Girondins—are crucial to understand-
ing French policy making in the closing months of 1792. Particularly, 
French general Charles-François Dumouriez consistently opposed Bris-
sot’s plans for an expansive attack on all the Spanish American colo-
nies. Based on the sometimes competing goals and perspectives of 
Lebrun, Brissot, and Dumouriez, the origin of the Genet mission sheds 
light not only on a significant episode of American history but also on 
the dynamics of French decision making at the outset of the National 
Convention.
Girondin executive power began in March 1792, when King Louis XVI, 
under pressure from the National Assembly, appointed several of Bris-
8 Ammon, Genet Mission, 19.
9 Linda Frey and Marsha Frey, “‘The Reign of the Charlatans Is Over’: The French Revo-
lutionary Attack on Diplomatic Practice,” Journal of Modern History 65 (1993): 707. Frey and Frey 
even misidentify Brissot as minister of foreign affairs. See also Richard K. Murdoch, “The Gene-
sis of the Genêt Schemes,” French American Review 2 (1949): 81–97; William F. Keller, “The Fron-
tier Intrigues of Citizen Genet,” Americana 34 (1940): 575–77; and Frederick A. Schminke, Genet: 
The Origins of His Mission to America (Toulouse, 1939).
10 His full name was Pierre-Henri-Hélène-Marie Lebrun-Tondu, though he dropped 
Tondu. See Patricia Chastain Howe, Foreign Policy and the French Revolution: Charles François Dumou-
riez, Pierre LeBrun, and the Belgian Plan, 1789–1793 (New York, 2008), 191n1.
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sot’s allies as ministers in the Executive Council. For months, Brissot 
and other Girondin legislators had been asserting more control over 
foreign affairs and pushing for action against French émigrés who 
were allegedly inciting counterrevolutionary hostility abroad, particu-
larly from within Austrian territory. Political pressure for war escalated 
as Brissot and his colleagues increasingly saw Austria as the primary 
threat to the safety of the Revolution. After the National Assembly 
impeached Foreign Minister Antoine de Valdec de Lessart in March, 
the king named Dumouriez as his successor. Dumouriez and his newly 
appointed deputy, Lebrun, also were fervent advocates of war against 
Austria. With their support and Brissot’s efforts in the National Assem-
bly, France declared war on April 20, 1792.11
 Brissot’s bellicose declarations espousing the need for a Franco-
Austrian war have incited substantial scholarly discussion, which is a 
good starting point for understanding both the context and the signifi-
cance of the Genet affair. Although Brissot couched his support for war 
in revolutionary language, most historians agree that Girondin leaders 
used the Austrian threat to advance their own domestic political agen-
da.12 Indeed, at times Brissot was frank about the self-serving role of 
counterrevolutionary threats. “I have only one fear,” Brissot wrote in 
December 1791, “it is that we won’t be betrayed. We need great trea-
sons; our salvation lies there, because there are still strong doses of poi-
son in France and strong emetics are needed to expel them.”13 Clearly, 
Brissot was ready to exploit the threat of counterrevolution to advance 
his revolutionary goals and his own career.
 Nevertheless, calls for war were not entirely based on domestic 
political advancement. Dumouriez and Lebrun were advocates of Bel-
gian liberation long before 1792.14 And Brissot’s professed belief in the 
11 Howe, Foreign Policy, 49–61. A lengthier version of Howe’s argument with more complete 
citations is presented in Patricia Chastain Howe, “French Revolutionary Policy and the Belgian 
Project, 1789–1793” (PhD diss., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1982).
12 T. C. W. Blanning, The Origins of the French Revolutionary Wars (New York, 1986), 99–113; 
Thomas E. Kaiser, “From the Austrian Committee to the Foreign Plot: Marie-Antoinette, Austro-
phobia, and the Terror,” French Historical Studies 26 (2003): 587–88; Thomas E. Kaiser, “La fin du 
renversement des alliances: La France, l’Autriche et la déclaration de guerre du 20 avril 1792,” 
Annales historiques de la Révolution française, no. 351 (2008): 77–98. In this latter article Kaiser 
accepts that the Brissotins used war propaganda for their own political purposes, but he says that 
the effectiveness of this propaganda depended on underlying French Austrophobia and threat-
ening actions by the Hapsburgs. See also Frank L. Kidner, “The Girondists and the ‘Propaganda 
War’ of 1792: A Reevaluation of French Revolutionary Foreign Policy from 1791–1793” (PhD diss., 
Princeton University, 1971). Kidner’s unpublished dissertation contains a section (pp. 264–76) 
on the Genet affair that, although not nearly as comprehensive, bears the closest resemblance to 
this essay.
13 Quoted in John Hardman, “The Real and Imagined Conspiracies of Louis XVI,” in Con-
spiracy in the French Revolution, ed. Peter R. Campbell, Thomas E. Kaiser, and Marisa Linton (Man-
chester, 2007), 76.
14 Howe, Foreign Policy, 9–40; Gary Savage, “Favier’s Heirs: The French Revolution and the 
Secret du Roi,” Historical Journal 41 (1998): 249–50.
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Austrian threat may have been genuine, even if self-serving.15 Assess-
ing such rhetoric requires sensitivity not only to the ulterior motives of 
propaganda but also to pervasive uncertainty and the potential danger 
posed if a conspiracy went undetected.16 The point here is not to dis-
tinguish whether the French war hawks were motivated by ideological 
goals of spreading the Revolution or personal goals of advancing their 
careers. Rather, these objectives were so inextricably intertwined in the 
Austrian campaign that untying the knot is practically, if not theoreti-
cally, impossible. The difficulty of disaggregating Girondin motivations, 
however, tends to mask genuine differences in their political views and 
goals. Although the declaration of war on Austria was indisputably 
more important, the planning of Genet’s mission provides a clearer pic-
ture of the heterogeneous foreign policy outlooks of Lebrun, Brissot, 
and Dumouriez.17
 After war was declared, the relationship between Dumouriez and 
Brissot’s closest allies in the ministry became increasingly strained. A 
significant body of literature has examined the strength and cohesive-
ness of the Girondin party within the National Convention.18 Much 
of this literature, however, excludes the first months of the Conven-
tion and ignores the Executive Council.19 Nonetheless, early divisions 
15 Savage argues that domestic political incentives probably were a necessary but not suffi-
cient reason for Brissot’s warmongering (“Favier’s Heirs,” 247–56, esp. 252n132). Timothy Tackett 
states that “Brissot was not above demagoguery, and in the previous months he had proposed 
several different and sometimes contradictory conspiracy theories. But whatever the reality of the 
‘grand conspiracy’ set out by Brissot and Gensonné, it is clear that a large number of their fellow 
deputies believed it was real” (“Conspiracy Obsession in a Time of Revolution: French Elites and 
the Origins of the Terror, 1789–1792,” American Historical Review 105 [2000]: 691–92).
16 This point is made nicely in Kaiser, “La fin du renversement des alliances,” 98; and 
Marisa Linton, “‘Do You Believe That We’re Conspirators?’ Conspiracies Real and Imagined in 
Jacobin Politics, 1793–94,” in Campbell, Kaiser, and Linton, Conspiracy in the French Revolution, 128.
17 Looking at an earlier period, Jeremy Whiteman finds that some French radicals “wished 
France to have no truck whatsoever with the supposedly corrupt practices of the past, such as 
secret dealings and alliance diplomacy, or with notions such as the international balance of 
power. . . . The majority of Patriot deputies, however, in particular those who would emerge as the 
‘Feuillants,’ had a more flexible and pragmatic view.” He views the increasing marginalization of 
the “language” of pragmatism as a key element in the declaration of war on Austria (Reform, Revo-
lution, and French Global Policy, 1787–1791 [Aldershot, 2003], 254). This article tries to show how 
the interplay of competing views continued to shape French foreign policy even after the king was 
deposed.
18 Michael J. Sydenham, The Girondins (London, 1961), argues that the Girondins did not 
really exist as a distinct entity in the National Convention. This point is contested in several subse-
quent works. See Alison Patrick, “Political Divisions in the French National Convention, 1792–93,” 
Journal of Modern History 41 (1969): 421–74; Patrick, The Men of the First French Republic: Political Align-
ments in the National Convention of 1792 (Baltimore, MD, 1972); Theodore A. DiPadova, “The Giron-
dins and the Question of Revolutionary Government,” French Historical Studies 9 (1976): 432–50. 
Two more recent studies show weaknesses in the idea of a distinct Girondin faction but again refer 
only to activity in the Convention. See Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Anne Hildreth, and Alan B. Spitzer, 
“Was There a Girondist Faction in the National Convention, 1792–1793?” French Historical Studies 
15 (1988): 519–36; and Benjamin Reilly, “Polling the Opinions: A Reexamination of Mountain, 
Plain, and Gironde in the National Convention,” Social Science History 28 (2004): 53–73.
19 This point is made, for instance, in Gary Kates, “Commentary to Lewis-Beck et al.,” French 
Historical Studies 15 (1988): 543–46.
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within the Girondin faction are well known.20 In the middle of 1792, 
a split occurred between Dumouriez and Brissot’s closest allies in the 
Executive Council—Jean-Marie Roland, Joseph Servan, and Etienne 
Clavière. The conflict stemmed from Dumouriez’s opposition to a legis-
lative decree that abolished the king’s Constitutional Guard; it esca-
lated to the point where Dumouriez and Servan drew swords.21 In June 
the king forced the Girondin ministers out of the government and 
appointed Dumouriez to replace Servan as minister of war. This early 
conflict is especially important because Lebrun was a top deputy—and 
one of Dumouriez’s allies—in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although 
historians frequently group Lebrun and Dumouriez together with the 
Girondins, it should be remembered that even domestically their dif-
ferences were sometimes significant.
 Months later Dumouriez and the Girondins reached a fragile 
détente.22 On August 10, 1792, the National Assembly deposed the 
king and convened a provisional Executive Council.23 Brissot’s allies 
resumed their posts in what was to be the height of Girondin power. 
The National Assembly also elected Lebrun as minister of foreign affairs 
and gave Dumouriez command of the army. Lebrun quickly pledged 
his full support to Dumouriez.24 With domestic stability weak and the 
Allied armies threatening French security, the Girondins depended on 
Dumouriez to control the military.25
 In early October, however, an exchange between Dumouriez and 
Lebrun highlighted persistent tensions. Lebrun wrote on behalf of 
the Executive Council requesting Dumouriez’s cooperation in settling 
a conflict within the command of the army.26 Days later, Dumouriez 
replied with a blistering letter: “I confess to you, my friend, that I am 
unhappy with these two letters; they do not carry the true, concise, 
forthright character that suits six ministers of a great Republic. I see 
in them the mismanagement, the banality, and the flattery of the old 
regime. You seem to fear your generals; you seem to not have enough 
20 Sydenham, Girondins, presents a more narrative-based study of these differences, includ-
ing those in the Executive Council.
21 Howe, Foreign Policy, 81–82; Samuel F. Scott and Barry Rothaus, eds., Historical Dictionary 
of the French Revolution, 1789–1799, 2 vols. (Westport, CT, 1985), 2:900.
22 After Dumouriez’s defection, Brissot denied his past connection with the general. 
Though some historians have accepted Brissot’s word, it is disproved by the evidence. See H. A. 
Goetz-Bernstein, La diplomatie de la Gironde: Jacques-Pierre Brissot (Paris, 1912), 329–30.
23 Although only a few Girondins played a role in the insurrection—primarily led by the 
Montagnards and the Paris mob—Brissot and his associates were, in the short term, its principal 
beneficiaries. See Leigh Whaley, “Political Factions and the Second Revolution: The Insurrection 
of 10 August 1792,” French History 7 (1993): 205–24.
24 Howe, Foreign Policy, 93.
25 For a discussion of this mutual dependence, see Richard M. Brace, “General Dumouriez 
and the Girondins, 1792–1793,” American Historical Review 56 (1951): 493–509.
26 Lebrun to Dumouriez, Oct. 7, 1792, in Charles Nauroy, ed., Révolutionnaires (Paris, 1891), 
176–78.
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trust in their frankness and in their patriotism.”27 The letters, although 
replete with pleasantries expressing Dumouriez’s and Lebrun’s mutual 
regard, illustrate the delicate balance Lebrun had to maintain between 
his Girondin colleagues and the ambitious Dumouriez.
 While trying to placate Dumouriez, Lebrun also had to manage 
his responsibilities as minister of foreign affairs.28 A month after the 
August 10 coup, Lebrun wrote to the unofficial French emissary to 
Great Britain, Bernard-François de Chauvelin. “We are informed . . . 
that the people of Louisiana want to shake the yoke of Spanish tyranny,” 
Lebrun stated. “England would have an even better opportunity for this 
conquest now that Spain is left on her own and without hope of assis-
tance from us.”29 Lebrun’s letter provides several important insights. 
It reveals an interest in Louisiana and indicates his satisfaction at the 
idea of Spain losing its territory. More significantly, however, the let-
ter shows Lebrun’s acquaintance with the discontent of Louisiana’s 
inhabitants but reveals no concern for their general freedom. Instead 
of promoting Louisiana’s liberation, Lebrun was suggesting that Brit-
ain overtake Spanish territory. His motives toward Louisiana, at least in 
September 1792, seem to have been concerned mainly with the balance 
of European power.30
 Several weeks later, talk of the Spanish colonies resurfaced. Fran-
cisco de Miranda, a Venezuelan expatriate who had recently assumed 
a post in the French military, had developed plans with Brissot for a 
French-led expedition against Spanish possessions in Central and 
South America. The design included using the French colony of Saint-
Domingue (now Haiti) as a base of operations and recruiting soldiers 
in the United States to join the conquest.31 On October 13, 1792, Bris-
27 Dumouriez to Lebrun, Oct. 9, 1792, in Nauroy, Révolutionnaires, 179.
28 Between Servan’s resignation and Jean-Nicholas Pache’s appointment, Lebrun also 
served as acting minister of war.
29 Lebrun to Chauvelin, Sept. 14, 1792, in Albert Sorel, L’Europe et la Révolution française, 
8 vols. (Paris, 1885–1904), 3:20. Britain had withdrawn Chauvelin’s status as minister plenipoten-
tiary after the king was deposed. See Howe, Foreign Policy, 132.
30 Franco-British relations remained relatively peaceful until the French incursion into Bel-
gium in early November. See William Doyle, The Oxford History of the French Revolution (New York, 
1989), 200.
31 An informative article on this proposal is Marcel Dorigny, “Brissot et Miranda en 1792, 
ou comment révolutionner l’Amérique espagnole?” in La France et les Amériques au temps de Jefferson 
et de Miranda, ed. Marcel Dorigny and Marie-Jeanne Rossignol (Paris, 2001), 93–105. This article 
gives some discussion of what Brissot may have wished to do with the conquered territory. Fur-
ther literature on Miranda’s South American designs while in France can be found in Carmen L. 
Bohórquez-Morán, Francisco de Miranda, précurseur des indépendances de l’Amérique latine (Montreal, 
1998), 151–60; Tomás Polanco Alcántara, Francisco de Miranda: Bosquejo de una biografía; ¿Don Juan 
o Don Quijote? (Caracas, 1996), 283–305; and Karen Racine, Francisco de Miranda: A Transatlantic 
Life in the Age of Revolution (Wilmington, DE, 2003), 117–18. Miranda’s papers have been published 
in Archivo del General Miranda, 24 vols. (Caracas, 1929–50). For a Spanish translation, see Josefina 
Rodríguez de Alonso, ed., Colombeia, 18 vols. to date (Caracas, 1978–). Less comprehensive col-
lections of Miranda’s French revolutionary papers appear in Edgardo Mondolfi, ed., Francisco de 
Miranda en Francia (Caracas, 1992); and J[osé] M[aría] Antepara, ed., South American Emancipation: 
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sot wrote to Miranda in glowing language: “Only you appear capable of 
leading the expedition. Your name and your talents would guarantee 
success.” Brissot stated that he had revealed his views to all the minis-
ters and that “they have sensed the advantages.” Nevertheless, Dumou-
riez, who had recently returned to Paris as a hero after his victory at 
Valmy, apparently opposed the scheme and had not replied to Bris-
sot’s inquiries. Brissot therefore entreated Miranda: “The success of 
this undertaking depends on you and Dumouriez: that he consents and 
you leave; therefore, speak with or write to him. The moment is right; 
if we let it pass, it may not return again.”32
 Such a grand scheme of revolutionary conquest was not uncom-
mon for Brissot. He later stated in a letter to former minister of war 
Servan: “I hold that our liberty will never again be peaceful as long as 
there is a Bourbon on the throne.”33 He then explained his logic for 
striking at the Spanish colonies. “Well convinced that it was necessary 
to hit Spain in all its sensitive parts, I believed that it was necessary to 
reflect on making Spanish America rise up, and what better man for 
this job than Miranda!”34
 In addition to his fiery views on international relations, Brissot had 
visited the United States and was passionate about American affairs. 
“Westerners are convinced that navigation on the Mississippi cannot 
remain closed for long,” Brissot wrote in 1791. “They are determined to 
get it, either amicably or by force; they will succeed, even if they have 
to preach a crusade to do so. Even Congress will not be able to check 
their will. . . . A small quarrel will be enough to inflame men’s minds, 
and if ever the Americans march on New Orleans, it will fall before 
them.”35 These comments are only a small part of Brissot’s large trea-
tise on the United States, but they show his acute interest in the Ameri-
can West and his unchecked confidence in the revolutionary potential 
of its inhabitants.36
Documents, Historical and Explanatory, Shewing the Designs Which Have Been in Progress, and the Exertions 
Made by General Miranda, for the South American Emancipation during the Last Twenty-five Years (Lon-
don, 1810).
32 Claude Perroud, ed., J.-P. Brissot: Correspondance et papiers (Paris, 1912), 304. Miranda’s 
commission into the French army specifically stated that “in the moment the occasion presents 
itself ” he had permission to begin his Latin American conquest (Archivo del General Miranda, 
8:7–8). Miranda also wrote of his plans to the Girondin mayor of Paris, Jerôme Pétion, affirm-
ing his devotion both to the French republic and to his homeland of Venezuela. See Miranda to 
Pétion, Oct. 26, 1792, in Rodríguez de Alonso, Colombeia, 10:273–74.
33 France had deposed its Bourbon monarch in August, but Spain remained under the rule 
of a Bourbon king.
34 Brissot to Servan, Nov. 26, 1792, in Perroud, J.-P. Brissot, 312.
35 Jacques-Pierre Brissot de Warville, New Travels in the United States of America, 1788, trans. 
Mara Soceanu Vamos and Durand Echeverria (Cambridge, MA, 1964), 421–22.
36 Brissot also was involved in American land speculation, which probably influenced his 
views. See nn. 95–96 below.
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 Most historians have cited Brissot’s idealism and interest in Ameri-
can affairs as the key factors in the French decision to send Genet to 
the United States. Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick argue that “Bris-
sot’s zeal was such that he saw no reason why the Revolution’s principles 
should not be spread across the world, if necessary by force. . . . And 
it was the mentality represented by Brissot that gave the tone to the 
Genet mission, and that shaped Genet’s instructions.”37 Ammon, the 
most recent and comprehensive historian of the Genet mission, states 
that “Brissot, as a member of the Diplomatic Committee of the Con-
vention, became the responsible architect of French policy towards the 
United States.”38 French scholars similarly place Brissot at the heart of 
the Genet mission’s origin.39
 Primary evidence, however, shows that Girondin leaders were not 
in agreement on how or why France should attack Spanish colonies. 
The path Lebrun eventually chose differed significantly from Brissot’s 
plan for South American conquest. Although the extent of discord 
should not be overstated, the decision to send Genet reflects the more 
pragmatic impulses of the foreign ministry—not an outright triumph 
of Brissot’s revolutionary zeal.
 Sending an emissary to the western United States to stir up discon-
tent and raise an army against Spanish Louisiana may seem revolution-
ary and idealistic, but, in fact, similar plots were hatched by various 
European powers throughout the Federalist era.40 In 1793 Spain con-
spired with slaves in Saint-Domingue (promising them freedom and 
land) in order to destabilize French colonial rule.41 In 1797 the U.S. 
Senate impeached one of its own members, William Blount, for having 
made overtures to Britain regarding a plan to raise disaffected Ameri-
37 Elkins and McKitrick, Age of Federalism, 331–32.
38 Ammon, Genet Mission, 17.
39 For example,Marcel Dorigny states: “Si Brissot n’y figurait pas [dans le ministère jacobin], 
il en était l’âme et le guide officieux. Il ne faut pas non plus perdre de vue sa position stratégique 
au sein du Comité diplomatique de l’Assemblée législative: aucune décision importante n’échap-
pait alors à son regard et ses amis politiques furent promus à des postes importants. Dans deux 
secteurs qui lui tenaient particulièrement à cœur, les affaires coloniales et les relations franco-
américaines, il infléchit très directement les décisions du ministère. Pour orienter la politique 
des Etats-Unis en faveur de la France nouvelle, Brissot fit nommer ministre de France à Phila-
delphie un de ses proches, le fameux ‘citoyen Genet,’ comme les Américains le désignèrent tou-
jours” (“Sonthonax et Brissot: Le cheminement d’une filiation politique assumée,” Revue française 
d’histoire d’outre mer 84 [1997]: 35–36). See also Claude Moisy, Le citoyen Genet: La Révolution française 
à l’assaut de l’Amérique (Toulouse, 2007). A good review of earlier French literature supporting the 
orthodox thesis appears in Kidner, “Girondists,” 7–53.
40 For an excellent article on the American impetus for these intrigues, see Andrew R. L. 
Cayton, “‘When Shall We Cease to Have Judases?’ The Blount Conspiracy and the Limits of the 
‘Extended Republic,’” in Launching the “Extended Republic”: The Federalist Era, ed. Ronald Hoffman 
and Peter J. Albert (Charlottesville, VA, 1996), 156–89.
41 Laurent Dubois, Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution (Cambridge, 
MA, 2004), 152–53.
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can frontiersmen against Spanish Louisiana.42 Few would argue that 
these Spanish and British plots were revolutionary, in the sense that 
their inspiration was a desire to extend freedom and republicanism. 
Rather, the schemes were opportunistic and motivated by contempo-
rary geopolitics. Similar concerns were also central to French decision 
making in 1792. Lebrun wanted to spread the gains of the Revolution 
abroad, but he was adeptly aware of the European balance of power 
and the limits of French resources. He showed pragmatism in using the 
Genet affair not merely to spread freedom but also to attack Spanish 
interests with efficiency.
 Although Brissot claimed to have the Executive Council’s support 
for the proposed Miranda expedition, Dumouriez clearly opposed the 
idea, and thus it probably lacked the support of Lebrun. Some schol-
ars have argued that Lebrun—not Brissot—was dominant in foreign 
affairs.43 Frank Kidner, making extensive use of files in the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, concludes that although colleagues in the ministry 
counseled and pressured him, Lebrun “managed generally to keep the 
initiative in foreign policy because the regular business of his office 
was automatically left to him and thus he alone made the final deci-
sions or selected problems for presentations to the Council at large.”44 
Patricia Howe agrees, arguing that Lebrun and Dumouriez dominated 
the making of foreign policy.45 Indeed, Brissot plainly acknowledged 
his own helplessness in a letter to Servan in November: “My friend, I 
do not find in the other ministers, except Clavière, the activity that is in 
my head. . . . Lebrun appeared to me opposed to the system of attack-
ing Spain.”46 Though many historians have assumed that Brissot man-
aged foreign policy and that his views were in harmony with those of 
the Executive Council, the evidence suggests otherwise.
 In the midst of this internal debate over how to proceed in its con-
duct toward the New World, the French government received a pro-
vocative proposal from an American frontiersman named James Cole 
Mountflorence. Serving as a business agent for Southwest Territorial 
Governor William Blount, Mountflorence had arrived in Paris in May 
1792 and was well acquainted with several leading members of the 
42 Buckner F. Melton Jr., The First Impeachment: The Constitution’s Framers and the Case of Senator 
William Blount (Macon, GA, 1998).
43 Turner twice states that Lebrun was made minister of foreign affairs due to the influence 
of Brissot. Although this is possible, Turner offers no evidence to support his claim. See Turner, 
“Origin of Genet’s Projected Attack,” 654; and Frederick Jackson Turner, “Documents on the 
Relations of France to Louisiana, 1792–1795,” American Historical Review 3 (1898): 503.
44 Kidner, “Girondists,” 246.
45 Howe, “French Revolutionary Policy,” 538. The scholarship of both Kidner and Howe is 
distinguished by extensive use of primary-source material pertaining to French foreign affairs.
46 Brissot to Servan, Nov. 26, 1792, in Perroud, J.-P. Brissot, 312. Interestingly, Brissot’s state-
ment indicates that other ministers—not just Lebrun—were opposed to the plan.
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National Convention.47 His letter to Lebrun is not mentioned in any of 
the existing secondary literature, apparently having been overlooked 
by the copyist assisting Frederick Jackson Turner.48 Nevertheless, cer-
tain aspects of the letter indicate that Mountflorence’s proposal might 
have influenced Lebrun’s thinking in the direction of what eventually 
became the Genet mission. Writing on October 26, 1792, Mountflo-
rence opened in language meant to capture the Girondin imagination:
It is in the universal interest of the people as well as the French 
republic to annihilate the despotism of the crowned tyrants, and 
especially those of the house of Bourbon who will always find most 
lethal displeasure in the abolition of royalty in France. In case there 
is a rupture with Spain, there is an easy and inexpensive way to 
restore liberty to the inhabitants of Louisiana and Florida, which 
would be more than a small contribution to the general emancipa-
tion of all southern America from Castille’s tyrannical yoke.49
Mountflorence continued by describing the discontent of the western 
frontiersmen with their Spanish occupiers. He then not so humbly pro-
posed to raise a legion of disaffected frontiersmen, under French com-
missions, that he would lead against Spanish Louisiana.50 Mountflo-
rence emphasized the ease of the mission and its minimal costs to the 
French government:
I do not want an enlistment, a uniform, or a salary. I only want to 
reserve the right to nominate the officers, to ensure that each has 
public spiritedness and courage and is trusted by the legion. I pro-
pose that this legion not exceed ten thousand men. . . . The only 
expense to France would be some field artillery . . . [and] we would 
also need gunpowder, lead and cannonballs; and it would be neces-
47 William Blount to James Cole Mountflorence, Nov. 1, 1791, Dreer Collection, Letters 
of Members of the Federal Convention, Pennsylvania Historical Society; Alice B. Keith, “Let-
ters from Major James Cole Mountflorence to Members of the Blount Family (William, John 
Gray, and Thomas) from on Shipboard, Spain, France, Switzerland, England, and America, Janu-
ary 22, 1792–July 21, 1796,” North Carolina Historical Review 14 (1937): 251–87; Wesley J. Campbell, 
“James Cole Mountflorence and the Politics of Diplomacy,” Tennessee Historical Quarterly 66 (2007): 
210–35; Mountflorence, Short Sketch of the Public Life of J. C. Mountflorence (Paris, 1804), 7. William 
Blount was governor of the federal territory known as the Territory South of the River Ohio, or 
the Southwest Territory, which in 1796 became the state of Tennessee.
48 Frederick Jackson Turner, ed., “Selections from the Draper Collection in the Possession 
of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, to Elucidate the Proposed French Expedition under 
George Rogers Clark against Louisiana, in the Years 1793–94,” in Annual Report of the American His-
torical Association for the Year 1896, 2 vols. (Washington, DC, 1897), 2:968. An exhaustive search of 
English and French secondary sources found no mention of the letter.
49 James Cole Mountflorence to [Lebrun], Oct. 26, 1792, Correspondance Politique, 
Espagne, vol. 634, fol. 93, Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Paris. For a full transla-
tion of the proposal and discussion of Mountflorence’s motivations, see Wesley J. Campbell, “The 
French Intrigue of James Cole Mountflorence,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 65 (2008): 
779–96.
50 Mountflorence stated, “This legion would be comprised of American hunters, Canadi-
ans and inhabitants of Illinois, all sworn enemies of Spanish despotism” (ibid., 795).
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sary to provide for the subsistence of the troops from the moment 
they assemble. The seizures that would be made would amply com-
pensate the Republic for her small advance.
Mountflorence concluded his proposal by mentioning the necessity of 
maintaining secrecy from Spain and from the United States to spare 
the latter “the inconvenience of having to oppose this plan of opera-
tions.” He also noted that, although he would lead the expedition, the 
French minister to the United States should know of the plan and could 
attempt to negotiate a new peace treaty.
 Lebrun undoubtedly ignored Mountflorence’s aspirations to lead 
a French regiment against Spanish Louisiana. The October 26 pro-
posal, however, might have spurred his thinking toward a compromise 
solution that could allow for the modest realization of Brissot’s revo-
lutionary ambitions in the New World while limiting the diversion of 
French military resources and the possibility of Spanish (and poten-
tially English) backlash. Whatever its effect, Mountflorence’s letter—
which probably crossed Lebrun’s desk around the turn of the month—
was followed days later by steps toward a remarkably similar plan. On 
November 5, 1792, Lebrun inquired at the Bureau of the Colonies for 
documents on Louisiana.51 The next day, he wrote to Dumouriez and 
apparently described his plan to send Genet to the United States to 
foment rebellion in the west.52 On November 19 the Executive Council 
officially informed Genet of his selection.53
 Having relatively little evidence, scholars have disputed who 
selected Genet as minister to the United States. Most sources, citing the 
51 Lebrun to Monge, Nov. 5, 1792, Correspondance Politique, Espagne, vol. 634, fol. 65, 
Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères; Mildred Stahl Fletcher, “Louisiana as a Factor in 
French Diplomacy from 1763 to 1800,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review 17 (1930): 369–70n16. 
Miranda, who was in Paris, seems to have been apprised of these developments, although appar-
ently he was confused as to their exact form. In a letter to Alexander Hamilton, Miranda wrote, 
“The official communications from the new appointed Minister of france, & the Information our 
friend Col. [William Stephens] Smith shall give to you, will Shew how things are grown ripe & 
into maturity for the Execution of those grand & beneficial projects we had in Contemplation.” 
He sent a similar letter to U.S. Secretary of War Henry Knox. See Miranda to Hamilton, Nov. 4, 
1792, in The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, ed. Harold C. Syrett, 27 vols. (New York, 1961–87), 13:16; 
and Miranda to Knox, Nov. 4, 1792, in William S. Robertson, The Life of Miranda, 2 vols. (Chapel 
Hill, NC, 1929), 1:126–27. Miranda had previously met with Hamilton and Knox during a visit to 
the United States in 1784, when they had discussed Miranda’s dreams of Spanish American con-
quest. Jefferson’s notes record a conversation with Smith on Feb. 9, 1793, stating that Smith had 
departed from Paris on Nov. 9, that the French were sending Genet, and that “they propose to 
emancipate S. America, and will send 45. ships of the line there in the spring, and Mirande [sic] 
at the head of the expedition” (The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Julian Boyd et al., 35 vols. to date 
[Princeton, NJ, 1950–], 25:243).
52 Sorel, L’Europe et la Révolution française, 3:157. This letter has not been found after several 
searches and inquiries in Paris. Sorel is the only known source of its contents, which he summa-
rizes: “Lebrun arranged the means of occupying Spain elsewhere. Miranda came to confer with 
him about the grand project of revolution in the Spanish colonies. He decided to send Genet to 
the United States with the secret mission of fomenting that revolution.”
53 Lebrun to Genet, Nov. 19, 1792, Genet Papers, Library of Congress.
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writings of Louis-Guillaume Otto and Madame Roland, attribute the 
selection to Brissot.54 In 1797 Otto stated that “Brissot then enjoyed an 
influence without bounds in the diplomatic committee and in the Min-
istry. He proposed Genet to fill the post of minister plenipotentiary 
in the United States.”55 Roland’s memoirs agree: “The choice of an 
envoy to the United States was more wisely handled. Brissot is blamed 
for the part he took in it, but in fact it was greatly to his credit. . . . 
He suggested Genest.”56 Though possible, neither Roland’s nor Otto’s 
account has much credibility. It is doubtful that Madame Roland was 
in a position to know firsthand who appointed Genet, and her diaries 
remain an unreliable source of information.57 Although Otto might 
have been in a position to know, his status as a government official and 
his desire to distance himself from what was widely considered a mis-
conceived and failed mission seem to have influenced his statements.58 
Another account comes from an article by Eugene Sheridan, stating 
that “the chief architects of Genet’s mission [were] Brissot, Lebrun, 
and Clavière.”59 There is no evidence that Minister of Finance Etienne 
Clavière had any role in the Genet appointment.60
54 See, e.g., Eloise Ellery, Brissot de Warville: A Study in the History of the French Revolution (Bos-
ton, 1915), 315. Ammon, citing Ellery, states that Genet’s instructions “were drafted by Brissot 
and his colleagues on the Diplomatic Committee after a thorough review of the files in the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs” (Genet Mission, 22). Ellery’s book, however, never makes this claim. There 
is no known evidence that Brissot and the Diplomatic Committee handled the writing of Genet’s 
instructions, which were dated Dec. 1792 and probably written by or under the close guidance of 
Lebrun. The Committee of General Defense mentioned by Ellery came into being in 1793; thus 
Ammon’s inference cannot be correct. Madame Roland’s name in full was Marie-Jeanne Roland 
de la Platière. She was married to Minister of the Interior Jean-Marie Roland de la Platière.
55 Correspondance Politique, Etats-Unis Supplément, vol. 2, fol. 2, Archives du Départe-
ment des Affaires Etrangères, published, with minor changes, in Louis-Guillaume Otto, Considé-
rations sur la conduite du gouvernement américain envers la France, depuis le commencement de la Révolution 
jusqu’en 1797, ed. Gilbert Chinard (Princeton, NJ, 1945).
56 Evelyn Shuckburgh, ed. and trans., The Memoirs of Madame Roland (London, 1989), 102–3. 
The spelling Genest was frequent in newspapers, but Genet and those who knew him consistently 
spelled his name Genet.
57 Madame Roland had a strong distaste for Lebrun, which might have influenced her 
account; see Shuckburgh, Memoirs of Madame Roland, 100. For Roland’s unreliability on such mat-
ters, see Howe, “French Revolutionary Policy,” 507.
58 After the Montagnards gained power, Otto was harsh in his appraisal of the Genet mis-
sion, thus ingratiating himself with the new regime. During the Girondin ministry, however, Otto 
helped direct the mission and seems to have played a pivotal role in its creation. See Sheridan, 
“Recall of Edmond Charles Genet,” 479–80; and Elkins and McKitrick, Age of Federalism, 815.
59 Sheridan, “Recall of Edmond Charles Genet,” 478. The claim is repeated several times in 
the article and in the Jefferson papers, published a year later with Sheridan serving as senior asso-
ciate editor. See Boyd et al., Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 26:685.
60 Turner, whom Sheridan cites, merely stated that Clavière had been to the United States 
and had coauthored books with Brissot (“Origin of Genet’s Projected Attack,” 654). Clavière, as 
a member of the Executive Council, did take part in the approval of Genet after he was selected. 
He also authorized Genet to procure payment on the American debt. Although this is possible, 
there is no evidence to support the involvement implied by Sheridan. See Regina Katharine Cran-
dall, “Genet’s Projected Attack on Louisiana and the Floridas, 1793–94” (PhD diss., University of 
Chicago, 1902), 22–23.
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 Although Brissot and others might have influenced the selection 
of Genet as minister to the United States, the most convincing evidence 
suggests that Lebrun made the selection. Through their work in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the spring and summer of 1792, Dumou-
riez and Lebrun had been acquainted with Genet, who was chargé 
d’affaires in Russia.61 Shortly after assuming his new post as minister of 
foreign affairs in August, Lebrun wrote to Genet: “make your prepara-
tions to return to Paris as quickly as possible. Your known patriotism 
and the distinguished talents that you have developed during your resi-
dence at [Saint] Petersburg are titles too precious not to require me to 
present you with new means to serve your country usefully.”62 When 
Genet returned to Paris, by all accounts he ingratiated himself with 
the Girondin leaders, thus making it possible that others supported his 
appointment as minister to the United States. But within the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Lebrun held the responsibility of naming emissaries, 
and he seems to have made most decisions himself.63 Genet stated years 
later that Lebrun suggested his appointment at a dinner party. This 
hardly seems likely given that Genet was not in the country at the time 
of his selection.64 Nevertheless, Lebrun probably did appoint Genet.65
 Sometime after Genet’s selection had been decided but before his 
instructions were drawn—that is, sometime in late November or early 
December—Lebrun received a briefing on the Louisiana territory. The 
unsigned memorandum, which apparently was accompanied by an 
older report, went into detail on the prospect of an expedition against 
Spanish Louisiana. Although rarely cited, this fascinating report gives 
remarkable detail about western affairs, and it unmistakably helped 
shape the direction of the Genet mission. The author began with an 
immediate denunciation of the idea of vast South American conquest: 
“To embrace all at once the immense country which extends from New 
Mexico to Chile to create revolutions there, is to wish to lose touch 
with reality in favor of idle fancies. Without doubt, these immense pos-
61 For a summary of Genet’s tenure in Russia, see William L. Blackwell, “Citizen Genet and 
the Revolution in Russia, 1789–1792,” French Historical Studies 3 (1963): 72–92.
62 Lebrun to Genet, Aug. 17, 1792, quoted in Crandall, “Genet’s Projected Attack,” 14. 
At this point, Lebrun was not alluding to Genet’s appointment as minister to the United States. 
Rather, he intended to send Genet to Holland. See Lebrun to Genet, Oct. 10, 1792, Genet Papers.
63 Howe, “French Revolutionary Policy,” 506–10; Kidner, “Girondists,” 246.
64 See Woodfin, “Citizen Genet and His Mission,” 68–69. A pass signed by Montesquion 
suggests that Genet was on the Swiss border on Nov. 8, 1792, thus placing him outside Paris when 
he was selected as minister. See Genet Papers.
65 Robespierre later stated his belief that Lebrun and Brissot selected Genet. See Turner, 
“Documents,” 507. For Robespierre’s views on the Genet mission, see Jacques Godechot, “Robes-
pierre et l’Amérique,” Stanford French Review 2 (1978): 204–8. Lebrun would have been wise to 
seek out the approval of Brissot, who had blocked the nomination of Guillaume de Bonnecarrère, 
Lebrun’s previous choice for minister to the United States.
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sessions will not always stay under the Spanish yoke. But it does not 
depend on us to deliver them today.”66 Instead, the memorandum 
argued, “Louisiana promises more immediate, more certain, and less 
costly successes. These successes are not certain, but highly probable.” 
As in Mountflorence’s proposal, the unsigned note described restless-
ness among American frontiersmen and encouraged Lebrun to har-
ness that discontent against the Spanish. The author claimed that the 
westerners were “adventurers by principle and by habit” and that they 
could easily be induced to action by the promise of free navigation on 
the Mississippi River.
 The author continued by stating the importance of maintaining 
secrecy, both to preserve American neutrality and to avoid French 
diplomatic difficulty. He suggested that Genet send commissioners to 
Kentucky for the ostensible purpose of purchasing land and that these 
men might even take on an aristocratic air “to better deceive the pub-
lic’s surveillance.” After recruiting five hundred men along the Ohio, 
the commissioners should cover their movements as if they were merely 
assembling a corps of volunteers “against the Natives with whom the 
Americans are at war.” Additionally, in the interest of maintaining 
secrecy, Genet should carefully distance himself from the affair and 
place the blame on French immigrants at Scioto.67 He should further-
more persuade the U.S. government to explain the affair in the same 
manner to Spain and England in order to preserve American neutrality.
 Authorship of this detailed memorandum is presently unknown. 
The author identified himself as a Frenchman who apparently had also 
prepared a memoir that was the product of research conducted over 
five years. “I believed it to be possible to engage our former Govern-
ment to negotiate with Spain the retrocession of Louisiana,” the author 
noted, “but the circumstances did not permit it to take this up.” The 
author obviously had spent significant time in the United States. His 
proposal displayed a relatively sophisticated understanding of western 
affairs, including the mention of General James Wilkinson—a lead-
ing Kentucky politician and infamous western intrigant—as a possible 
man to lead the expedition. The letter also referred to Robert Breckin-
ridge—the new speaker of the Kentucky assembly—and Barthélemy 
Tardiveau—a local Frenchman who had exchanged letters with St. John 
66 Correspondance Politique, Espagne, vol. 634, fol. 456, Archives du Département des 
Affaires Etrangères. Also printed in Turner, “Selections,” 2:945–53.
67 Just years earlier the Scioto Company had sold to French immigrants fraudulent deeds 
for land near the confluence of the Ohio and Scioto Rivers. See Archer B. Hulbert, “The Meth-
ods and Operations of the Scioto Group of Speculators,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review 1 (1915): 
502–15; and Jocelyne Moreau-Zanelli, Gallipolis: Histoire d’un mirage américain au XVIIIe siècle (Paris, 
2000).
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de Crèvecoeur several years earlier.68 Additionally, an examination of 
the original memorandum in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reveals 
that it was filled with marginal notes and crossed-out passages. As such, 
it seems most likely to have been written by someone within the French 
ministry who was intimately acquainted with American affairs and had 
probably recently returned from the United States.
 Louis-Guillaume Otto fits this description perfectly and seems the 
probable author of the unsigned memorandum.69 Otto had served in 
the United States for many years as chargé d’affaires and had returned 
to France by early December 1792.70 His reports as chargé revealed 
information about the disgruntled attitudes of American frontiers-
men—information repeated in the unsigned note. Otto wrote in 1785 
to French foreign minister Charles Gravier, comte de Vergennes:
Interests equally strong agitate the minds of Americans in regard 
to Spain, and one must expect that the new settlements on the 
Mississippi will soon produce a revolution in Louisiana. . . . The 
Congress opposes in vain enterprises so distant from the center 
of government, and while protesting these hardly-provoked hos-
tilities, perhaps they would view with a secret satisfaction Spanish 
losses. . . . This revolution builds up daily and everything contrib-
utes to making it break out.71
On November 18, 1790, Otto wrote to Vergennes’s successor, Armand-
Marc, comte de Montmorin, “The western country is undoubtedly that 
which will give the first signal of defection, and the power which shall 
be in possession of New Orleans will be in a position to enjoy the first 
fruit or be the first victim of the effervescence of a rising people.”72 
In January 1793, shortly after the unsigned memorandum was written, 
Lebrun hired Otto to manage the first bureau, which included Ameri-
can affairs in its portfolio.73
68 James Ripley Jacobs, Tarnished Warrior: Major-General James Wilkinson (New York, 1938); 
Howard C. Rice, Barthélemy Tardiveau: A French Trader in the West (Baltimore, MD, 1938). Otto and 
Crèvecoeur were both in the French diplomatic corps in New York, and in 1790 Otto married 
Crèvecoeur’s daughter.
69 Pierre Lyonnet, who might otherwise have been a source of the note, was mentioned 
separately in the memorandum, thus implying different authorship. The writer stated, “Among 
those who presented themselves, Lyonnet is the most skillful and the wisest.”
70 Otto returned to France with recent diplomatic dispatches from New York that were 
marked as received in the Foreign Ministry on Dec. 8, 1792. See Turner, “Correspondence,” 2:160.
71 Paul G. Sifton, “Otto’s Mémoire to Vergennes, 1785,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 
22 (1965): 641–42.
72 Quoted in Crandall, “Genet’s Projected Attack,” 6. For biographical information, see 
Margaret M. O’Dwyer, “A French Diplomat’s View of Congress,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd 
ser., 21 (1964): 408–12; and Gay Wilson Allen and Roger Asselineau, St. John de Crèvecoeur: The Life 
of an American (New York, 1987), 159–61, 179–80.
73 Frédéric Masson, Le Département des Affaires Etrangères pendant la Révolution, 1787–1804 
(Paris, 1877), 243–44. Ammon suggests that Otto might have written part of Genet’s instructions 
(Genet Mission, 27).
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 The influence of Mountflorence’s letter and the unsigned memo-
randum is evident in Genet’s instructions. The first set of these instruc-
tions was dated December 1792 and covered various aspects of Genet’s 
mission.74 Among the objectives listed, France wanted “to open to the 
people of Kentucky the navigation of the Mississippi, to deliver our 
ancient brothers of Louisiana from the tyrannical yoke of Spain, and 
perhaps to reunite with the American Constellation the beautiful star 
of Canada.” To this end, the Executive Council authorized Genet to 
take measures to germinate revolution in Louisiana. His instructions 
stated that inhabitants of Kentucky would likely assist his efforts with-
out necessarily compromising Congress. The Council authorized Genet 
to maintain agents in Louisiana and Kentucky and to make necessary 
expenditures. In addition to using typical rhetoric about spreading free-
dom, the instructions also rationalized the mission on nonrevolution-
ary grounds: “Apart from the advantages that humanity in general will 
take from the success of this negotiation, we have in this moment a par-
ticular interest to prepare ourselves to act efficiently against England 
and Spain.” The author of Genet’s instructions was well acquainted with 
the geopolitical benefits that success of the mission might generate.
 A supplement to the instructions, dated December 23, 1792, 
authorized Genet to grant commissions to American Indians but 
included no other references to the western intrigues. These supple-
mental instructions, however, convey an overriding pragmatism to the 
mission.75 Genet was to ask President Washington for rigid enforce-
ment of several articles in the Franco-American treaty of 1778 in order 
to help French shipping interests in an impending war against Britain. 
The supplement also instructed Genet to acknowledge the constitu-
tional differences between France and the United States and exercise 
caution in his diplomacy—warnings that Genet energetically ignored.
 As with other aspects of the origin of the mission, the authorship 
of Genet’s instructions is speculative and widely disputed. Ammon 
states that Brissot and his colleagues on the Diplomatic Committee 
drafted the instructions, but his source—an old biography of Bris-
sot—says nothing to confirm the claim.76 The only known primary evi-
dence comes from Otto and Genet, both of whom stated years later 
that Genet drew his own instructions.77 Neither of the accounts is par-
74 The instructions, including the supplement, appear in Turner, “Correspondence,” 2:201–
12. For a more complete summary of the instructions, see Ammon, Genet Mission, 25–29.
75 Some have argued that the first set of instructions was meant for publication, but this 
seems highly doubtful, given the demanded secrecy of their contents. Apparently, only the first 
part of the first set of instructions was made public. See Elkins and McKitrick, Age of Federalism, 
815n89.
76 Ammon, Genet Mission, 22; Ellery, Brissot de Warville, 314–16.
77 Genet wrote to Thomas Jefferson on July 4, 1797: “I hurried the drawing up of my 
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ticularly credible independent of the other, but their coincidence—
particularly concerning the hurried manner in which the instructions 
were written—makes their claim significantly more believable. Regard-
less of who actually wrote the instructions, they embodied Lebrun’s 
ideas and were approved in the Executive Council.
 Previous scholars have suggested that Americans in Paris played 
a role in the creation of the French plot toward Spanish Louisiana.78 
Although possible, there is little evidence that Americans in Paris com-
municated with Lebrun about the scheme before it had already been 
formed—with Mountflorence as the one exception.79 Several Ameri-
cans and Frenchmen contacted Lebrun after Genet’s instructions 
already were drawn. Of these, it seems that Pierre Lyonnet’s letter was 
the only one to have been given serious attention.80 Eventually, Genet 
concerted his plans with a timely proposal from George Rogers Clark, 
a disgruntled American Revolutionary War hero who was living in Ken-
tucky. Clark’s offer, however, did not arrive in Paris until long after the 
Genet mission had taken shape.81
 In contrast to the public speeches made during the prelude to the 
war against Austria, discussions of French designs against the Span-
ish colonies were contained within the Executive Council and military 
leadership. There is no mention in Le patriote françois of any plans against 
Spanish colonies, and Genet’s appointment as minister to the United 
instructions which are the faithful result of the decrees of the Convention, of the decisions of the 
Committees, of the proclamations of the Council and of the opinions of the most influential per-
sonages.” See Meade Minnigerode, Jefferson, Friend of France, 1793: The Career of Edmond Charles Genet 
(New York, 1928), 416. Otto wrote in 1797 and again in 1801 that Genet hastily had written his own 
instructions. See Otto, Considérations, 11; and Woodfin, “Citizen Genet and His Mission,” 74n50.
78 Turner particularly viewed Thomas Paine, an Englishman by birth but with obvious ties 
to America, as an influential voice in the genesis of the Genet affair (“Origin of Genet’s Projected 
Attack,” 655–63); see also Woodfin, “Citizen Genet and His Mission,” 65–72; and Louis Didier, 
“Le citoyen Genet,” Revue des questions historiques 92 (1912): 66.
79 A short and undetailed letter from Gilbert Imlay, dated 1792, may have reached the 
French government before Genet’s instructions were drawn. Using biographical details and tex-
tual clues in the letter, Imlay’s biographer argues that the date was mistakenly added later and that 
the letter was probably submitted to the French government after Mar. 7, 1793. See Wil Verhoe-
ven, Gilbert Imlay: Citizen of the World (London, 2008), 153. Additionally, Sayre, Pereyrat, and Beau-
poils had presented Dumouriez with a proposal during the summer. See Turner, “Selections,” 
2:953–54. Lebrun was urged to ignore the latter design after it was repeated to the French gov-
ernment in 1793 (ibid., 2:946).
80 Ibid., 2:953–57; Turner, “Documents,” 491–510. For a useful summary of many of the 
proposals submitted to the French government, see Crandall, “Genet’s Projected Attack,” 30–36. 
A document in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, possibly written by the author of the 
unsigned memorandum, mentioned that Lyonnet’s memoir was the only one of value. See Turner, 
“Selections,” 2:945–46n3.
81 Turner ably argues this point (“Origin of Genet’s Projected Attack,” 650–71). Further 
evidence appears in Louise P. Kellogg, ed., “Letter of Thomas Paine, 1793,” American Historical 
Review 29 (1924): 501–5; John C. Parish, “The Intrigues of Doctor James O’Fallon,” Mississippi Val-
ley Historical Review 17 (1930): 230–63; and Samuel C. Williams, “French and Other Intrigues in the 
Southwest Territory, 1790–96,” East Tennessee Historical Society’s Publications 13 (1941): 21–35.
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States prompted only a one-sentence announcement.82 It is no sur-
prise, however, that Genet’s selection was not given much notice. Pub-
lic attention was directed at more pressing issues, such as the European 
wars and the fate of Louis XVI. Moreover, although Girondin leaders 
prided themselves on their transparency, Brissot’s plans for Miranda 
and his letters to Dumouriez concerning the prospective expedition 
were private.83
 The lack of wider political interest in Genet’s mission presents 
an opportunity to study the decision making of Brissot, Lebrun, and 
Dumouriez without having to struggle with disentangling the leaders’ 
domestic political motives. Though political reverberations might even-
tually have arisen from the mission, such an impact was far removed 
and uncertain. Girondin leaders did not publicize their efforts as they 
did in other campaigns, and their private discussions were void of refer-
ences to public opinion. Therefore, by looking at a relatively insignifi-
cant political issue such as the method of attack against Spanish colo-
nies, scholars can gain additional insight into the thought processes 
and motivations of the Girondin leaders.
The evidence presented thus far suggests that Dumouriez opposed Bris-
sot’s plans for wider Spanish American liberation and that Lebrun—
not Brissot—was primarily responsible for the formulation of Genet’s 
western intrigues. Understanding each of these figures’ motives and 
thought processes will not only elucidate the origin of the Genet 
affair but may also give some window into their decision making more 
generally.
 Dumouriez did not articulate his reasons for opposing Brissot’s 
plans. Rather, for over a month he simply ignored Brissot’s pleas. 
Dumouriez’s letters in the closing months of 1792 reveal that his focus 
was elsewhere. Miranda was one of his leading generals, and Dumou-
riez needed resources and political attention devoted to Belgian affairs 
82 Le patriote françois, Nov. 28, 1792, stated, “The patriot Genest comes to receive his due 
reward for the zeal and courage that he displayed in Russia; he is named minister plenipotentiary 
to the United States.” An article on Nov. 20, 1792, discussed Marie-Jean-Antoine-Nicholas de Cari-
tat, marquis de Condorcet’s views on Spanish liberation, but it said nothing about the Spanish 
colonies. The only controversy surrounding Genet’s appointment seems to have been the prod-
uct of a misunderstanding. A writer to the Annales patriotiques mistakenly identified Genet as the 
author of a letter that had been sent to the National Convention, and the writer said in passing 
that “people who have seen [Genet] in Russia have assured us that his civic mindedness was ques-
tionable at the least” (Annales patriotiques et littéraires de la France, Dec. 14, 1792). Genet responded: 
“My conduct [while in Russia] was known to the executive council, the Diplomatic Committee, 
and it was even judged to be honorable by the National Assembly” (Le patriote françois, Dec. 16, 
1792). Nothing more was said of the matter.
83 Marisa Linton, “Fatal Friendships: The Politics of Jacobin Friendship,” French Historical 
Studies 31 (2008): 65–66.
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to consolidate recent French gains.84 When he finally responded to 
Brissot’s repeated requests in late November, Dumouriez expressed 
only generic support for Spanish American independence: “Once mas-
ters of Holland’s navy we shall be strong enough to crush England, par-
ticularly by interesting the United States in sustaining our colonies and 
by executing a superb project of General Miranda.”85 Although sev-
eral scholars cite this communication to show Dumouriez’s support for 
revolutionary conquest, the letter was hardly a ringing endorsement of 
Brissot’s plans. First, Miranda’s participation was contingent on con-
trolling Holland. More importantly, evidence from Miranda’s papers 
reveals that Dumouriez still opposed the mission. Instead of rebuking 
Brissot directly, however, he sought Miranda’s assistance in terminating 
the project.
 In early December 1792, General François-Raymond Duval sent a 
letter to Miranda clarifying Dumouriez’s opposition to an expedition 
in South America. Writing from Dumouriez’s headquarters at Liège, 
Duval stated: “My dear General and friend, I hope that you remain 
the commander of our army and that you do not accept the offer to 
go to America; as advantageous as the position they offer you may be, 
General Dumouriez does not seem to approve of it and wants to speak 
with you about this matter.”86 “Please come here as soon as possible,” 
Dumouriez wrote Miranda several days later. “I need to speak with you, 
and I have received letters from Paris that concern you.”87
 Miranda was not able to meet with Dumouriez until two weeks later. 
The substance of their conversation is suggested in a letter Miranda 
wrote to Brissot within days of his meeting with Dumouriez:
The plan that you write in your letter is truly grand and magnificent, 
but I do not know if its execution is assured or even probable. With 
regard to the Spanish American continent and islands, I am well 
versed and able to form an exact opinion. But in everything con-
cerning the French islands and their situation today, I know almost 
nothing, and consequently it would be impossible for me to form an 
exact judgment on the matter. In your plan, the French islands are 
the foundation of the entire operation, given that the catalyst88 for 
84 Howe, Foreign Policy; Malcolm Deas, “Some Reflections on Miranda as Soldier,” in Fran-
cisco de Miranda: Exile and Enlightenment, ed. John Maher (London, 2006), 77–87. Deas argues that 
Miranda was a soldier of some repute.
85 Dumouriez to Brissot, Nov. 30, 1792, quoted in Sorel, L’Europe et la Révolution française, 
3:175.
86 Duval to Miranda, Dec. 3, 1792, in Rodríguez de Alonso, Colombeia, 10:283.
87 Dumouriez to Miranda, Dec. 7, 1792, ibid., 10:284. For Brissot’s correspondence with 
Dumouriez, see Brissot to Dumouriez, Nov. 28, 1792, in Antepara, Documents, Historical and 
Explanatory, 168–69; Brissot to Dumouriez, Dec. 9, 1792, in Perroud, J.-P. Brissot, 319–20; and 
Dorigny, “Brissot et Miranda en 1792,” 93–105.
88 I have translated “force agissante” as “catalyst,” although Miranda may also have intended 
a literal reference to the French military.
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revolution on the Spanish American continent must emerge from 
the French colonies, and it is necessary that we are confident our intel-
ligence [on affairs in Saint-Domingue] is truthful and accurate. It 
also seems to me that my appointment and my departure for Saint-
Domingue would be an alarm signal for the courts of Madrid and 
St. James, and that the effects of this would soon be felt in Cadiz 
[Spain] and Portsmouth [England], which would pose new obstacles 
to the business—an undertaking that is too large, too noble, and too 
captivating to be spoiled by a lack of precaution at the beginning.89
Though Miranda had spent his life firmly committed to Latin Ameri-
can liberation, even he doubted the efficacy of Brissot’s fanciful ideas. 
Miranda immediately sent Lebrun a copy of his reply to Brissot and 
asked that Lebrun keep him apprised of Brissot’s opinion, not wanting 
to offend him. Lebrun and Dumouriez seem to have shared Miranda’s 
hesitations about the plan’s feasibility and geopolitical consequences, 
and, given their recent communications, they probably influenced 
Miranda’s thinking.90
 While Dumouriez opposed Brissot’s plans for Miranda, there is no 
mention of him having any reaction to the announcement of the Genet 
mission. The planned offensive in Spanish Louisiana was to be covert, 
inexpensive, and not demanding on French resources. With his atten-
tion focused elsewhere, there is little reason to believe that Dumouriez 
gave Genet’s mission much thought. Brissot, however, was intrigued 
with American affairs.
 “What confidence,” Brissot once asked rhetorically, “can be placed 
in those men who, regarding the revolution but as their road to for-
tune, assume the appearance of virtue but to deceive the people?”91 
Yet some have questioned Brissot’s virtue and revolutionary motives. 
Indeed, Brissot was a shifty historical figure, and any single snapshot 
of him will certainly be incomplete. Nevertheless, his attitudes toward 
Spanish America in the fall of 1792 are revealing. Brissot’s plans for 
Miranda suggest a revolutionary leader with high ideals but, at least in 
the realm of transatlantic intrigues, little grasp of practical limitations.
 Much of the scholarly attention on Brissot concerns the sincerity 
of his motivations and revolutionary idealism. Building on accusations 
89 Miranda to Brissot, Dec. 19, 1792, in Aristides Rojas, ed., Miranda dans la Révolution 
française: Recueil de documents authentiques relatifs à l’histoire du général Francisco de Miranda, pendant 
son séjour en France de 1792 à 1798 (Caracas, 1889), 5–6. Miranda was in Anvers (Antwerp) at the 
beginning of the month and wrote Dumouriez a letter from Ruremonde on Dec. 15. Therefore he 
arrived at Liège between Dec. 15 and Dec. 19 (Archivo del General Miranda, 8:22).
90 Miranda to Lebrun, Dec. 19, 1792, in Alonso, Colombeia, 10:287. Brissot replied two weeks 
later that it was necessary to suspend the plan. See Brissot to Miranda, Jan. 6, 1793, in Rojas, 
Miranda dans la Révolution française, 10.
91 J.-P. Brissot de Warville, New Travels in the United States of America, trans. William Fairbank 
and Jeremiah Waring (London, 1792), xii.
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made during Brissot’s lifetime, an article by Robert Darnton concludes 
that during the 1780s Brissot was a police spy and hack writer who wrote 
revolutionary pamphlets mostly out of intellectual resentment and frus-
tration.92 This critique and its underlying evidence have elicited signifi-
cant debate. Frederick de Luna finds that “there is no good evidence 
that [Brissot] ever was a spy, and it would have been totally out of char-
acter. His whole life refutes the charge.”93 More recently, Simon Bur-
rows argues that Brissot worked for the police, but he finds it improb-
able that Brissot’s activities constituted spying. Burrows convincingly 
writes that Brissot’s prerevolutionary career shows a penchant to com-
promise when necessary to advance his goals.94
 Brissot’s motives and idealism have also been challenged, albeit 
unconvincingly, with respect to his American activities. In 1787 Brissot 
and his patron Clavière founded the Gallo-American Society, an orga-
nization to promote political and commercial ties between France and 
the United States. Funded through the auspices of the society, Brissot 
traveled to the United States in 1788 to study the fledgling democracy 
and its people, although his instructions from Clavière and other spon-
sors also requested that he investigate several modes of financial specu-
lation. Upon his arrival, Brissot contemplated investing in William 
Duer’s infamous Scioto land scheme. In the end, however, Brissot 
decided to speculate with Duer on American wartime currency and 
debts to France. Duer, a confidant of Alexander Hamilton, became the 
deputy secretary of the Treasury Department in 1789 and used his posi-
tion to feed Brissot inside information.95 These activities, which seem 
to have been the brainchild of Clavière, were among Brissot’s many flir-
tations with shady financial deals. After his return to Europe, Brissot 
advertised his own land venture in the United States, though he explic-
itly disclaimed any similarity between it and Duer’s Scioto fiasco.96
 Brissot and Clavière’s American speculation schemes have led to 
92 Robert Darnton, “The Grub Street Style of Revolution: J.-P. Brissot, Police Spy,” Journal 
of Modern History 40 (1968): 301–27. More recently, see Darnton, “The Brissot Dossier,” French His-
torical Studies 17 (1991): 191–205.
93 Luna, “Dean Street Style,” 190. See also H. T. Mason, ed., The Darnton Debate: Books and 
Revolutions in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 1998).
94 Simon Burrows concludes that “like most effective calumnies, those against Brissot con-
tained grains of truth, for he made compromises typical of the ancien régime” (“The Innocence 
of Jacques-Pierre Brissot,” Historical Journal 46 [2003]: 868). For Burrows’s wider appraisal of the 
Grub Street debate and significance of the French libelles, see his Blackmail, Scandal, and Revolution: 
London’s French Libellistes, 1758–1792 (Manchester, 2006). An interesting essay by Patrice Gueniffey 
on Brissot’s republican ideology also touches on this debate (“Brissot,” in La Gironde et les Giron-
dins, ed. François Furet and Mona Ozouf [Paris, 1991], 443–45).
95 Robert Sobel, Panic on Wall Street: A History of America’s Financial Disasters (New York, 1999), 
12–15; Ellery, Brissot de Warville, 72–73; Hulbert, “Methods and Operations,” 510–13.
96 Suzanne Desan, “Transatlantic Spaces of Revolution: The French Revolution, Sciotomanie, 
and American Lands,” Journal of Early Modern History 12 (2008): 501.
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doubts about their revolutionary motives. Samuel Bernstein states that 
Clavière “was a reckless adventurer, tied with many different person-
alities and totally lacking in principles. With this type of man Brissot 
developed close relations.” A recent article by Allan Potofsky speculates 
that “the Girondins may have adapted the Société Gallo-Américaine as 
a front for shady real estate dealings.” Although ultimately defending 
Brissot’s beneficent aims, Eloise Ellery wrote that the appearance of 
the Gallo-American Society seemed to be “an underhanded attempt to 
further [Brissot’s] own personal ends under the cloak of a public enter-
prise for the general good.”97
 Certainly Brissot took advantage of networking and business 
opportunities made possible by his leadership in prerevolutionary soci-
eties, but it is inappropriate to say without evidence that his attitudes 
toward the United States were disingenuous. His conception of the 
United States as bucolic and virtuous was part of a larger Americano-
phile political culture in France.98 It is true that Brissot was willing to 
profit from insider information from within the American government. 
But questionable business deals do not disqualify Brissot as a revolu-
tionary, especially during an era in which the lines between business 
and government interests were not as important or clearly defined, nor 
do financial incentives adequately explain the depth of Brissot’s politi-
cal and philosophical ideas on Franco-American relations.99 Neverthe-
less, Brissot’s penchant for exploiting ostensibly humanitarian causes 
for self-serving ends does raise questions about the extent of his ideal-
ism. In this respect, his persistent support for both Miranda and Genet 
may help shore up lingering doubts about Brissot’s willingness to act in 
accordance with his ideals.
 The extent of Brissot’s idealism is illustrated by juxtaposing his 
97 Samuel Bernstein, Essays in Political and Intellectual History (Freeport, NY, 1969), 30; Allan 
Potofsky, “The Political Economy of the French-American Debt Debate: The Ideological Uses of 
Atlantic Commerce, 1787 to 1800,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 63 (2006): 498; Ellery, Bris-
sot de Warville, 61.
98 See, e.g., Durand Echeverria, Mirage in the West: A History of the French Image of American 
Society to 1815 (Princeton, NJ, 1957), 116–74. See also Desan, “Transatlantic Spaces of Revolution,” 
467–505.
99 For an excellent discussion of Brissot’s ideas, see Marcel Dorigny, “La libre Amérique 
selon Brissot et Clavière: Modèle politique, utopie libérale, et réalisme économique,” preface to 
Etienne Clavière and J.-P. Brissot de Warville, De la France et des Etats-Unis (Paris, 1996), 7–29. See 
also Richard Whatmore and James Livesey, “Etienne Clavière, Jacques-Pierre Brissot et les fonda-
tions intellectuelles de la politique des girondins,” Annales historiques de la Révolution française, no. 
321 (2000): 1–26; Whatmore, “Commerce, Constitutions, and the Manners of a Nation: Etienne 
Clavière’s Revolutionary Political Economy, 1788–93,” History of European Ideas 22 (1996): 351–68; 
Robert Darnton, George Washington’s False Teeth: An Unconventional Guide to the Eighteenth Century (New 
York, 2003), 119–55; and Tamara Corriveau, “Jacques-Pierre Brissot, Etienne Clavière et la libre 
Amérique: Du gallo-américanisme à la mission Genet” (master’s thesis, Université de Montréal, 
2008). Although I do not examine the issue in this article, readers should be skeptical that Bris-
sot’s views on commercial republicanism necessarily represent those of his Girondin colleagues.
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ideas with those of Lebrun. Several clues indicate Lebrun’s reasons for 
sending Genet to instigate rebellion against Spanish Louisiana. In par-
ticular, Lebrun’s opposition to Brissot’s plans, his apparent reliance 
on Mountflorence’s letter and the unsigned memorandum—the influ-
ence of which is evident in Genet’s instructions—and his dealings with 
England all shed light on his motives. Lebrun’s and Brissot’s conduct 
should also be evaluated in view of the domestic and geopolitical con-
text in which they operated.
 In the closing months of 1792 Lebrun primarily was concerned 
with winning the war in Europe and establishing a republic in Belgium. 
He shared these priorities with Dumouriez, his predecessor and former 
superior in the Foreign Ministry.100 France was already at war with Prus-
sia and Austria and faced a possible conflict with Spain and England as 
well. Lebrun’s actions demonstrated the somewhat tactful avoidance 
of measures that might drain French resources or aggravate neutral 
powers. For instance, on December 19, 1792, Lebrun declared before 
the National Convention that France would not take subversive action 
against neutral countries.101 The declaration was probably intended 
in part to assuage France’s neighbors, and it indicates that Lebrun’s 
approach to foreign policy was significantly more restrained than the 
international crusade for liberty articulated in the National Conven-
tion’s declaration of November 19, 1792.102
 Lebrun showed additional restraint in opposing Brissot’s plans for 
subversive activities in Spain and costly and overt conquest in the Span-
ish colonies. As Lebrun knew, France could hardly afford to divert pre-
cious resources in an attempt to retrace the steps of Cortez and Pizarro. 
The country was in dire straits economically, and the government was 
operating under an enormous debt burden and fiscal deficit. In 1787 
outstanding government debts totaled about four billion livres (about 
80 percent of the gross national product), and the annual deficit was 
about a hundred million livres. With the beginning of the war against 
Austria, however, the French deficit in 1792 ballooned to nearly a billion 
livres. Not surprisingly, yields on French securities increased dramati-
cally, showing weak confidence in the French government and econ-
omy. Exports to the United States were falling, French gold reserves 
were being drained, and the assignat money scheme that Clavière had 
100 Patricia Chastain Howe, “Charles-François Dumouriez and the Revolutionizing of 
French Foreign Affairs in 1792,” French Historical Studies 14 (1986): 368–82.
101 Kidner, “Girondists,” 285–88; Howe, “French Revolutionary Policy,” 637.
102 Kidner disputes that the Nov. 19 declaration was genuinely motivated by support for 
universal liberty. Rather, he argues, the declaration was a response to particular conditions in the 
Rhineland, only couched in the rhetoric of universal liberty (“Girondists,” 231–37). Interestingly, 
Brissot opposed the declaration as worded.
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championed was foundering. France had already expropriated church 
lands and, because of poor credit, could not simply issue more debt to 
sustain spending.103
 Clavière and other Girondins continued to blame counterrevolu-
tionary émigrés for the failure of the assignats. The nature of the fiscal 
crisis, however, meant that French leaders had to take drastic actions. 
Compromising republican principles to meet the dire conditions, Cla-
vière’s proposed budget in October 1792 included such temporary exi-
gencies as a national lottery and a state monopoly in the arms trade. 
On December 15, 1792, the National Convention expropriated church 
lands in the conquered Belgian territory.104 These were the actions of 
a government on the verge of insolvency. Brissot’s Miranda scheme 
would have exacerbated France’s fiscal problems not only by creating 
short-term military expenditures; it also would have led to a costly war 
against Spain and, even more significantly, against Spain’s ally Britain.
 Further complicating Brissot’s plan was the proposed use of French 
troops stationed in Saint-Domingue, where slaves had been in revolt 
since August 1791. Conflict among white plantation owners, free blacks, 
and slaves was rampant, and the French colonial government had lost 
territorial control in several areas. In reaction, Girondin leaders in 
the National Assembly passed legislation that recognized full equality 
between whites and free blacks, and in the summer of 1792 France dis-
patched six thousand additional troops to quell the violence. Unrest 
continued, however, and though Lebrun’s precise thoughts on the con-
flict are unknown, he probably did not agree to the idea of diverting 
French military resources from Saint-Domingue.105
 Despite the impracticality of the prospective Miranda expedition, 
Lebrun faced continued pressure from Brissot.106 Although not in 
control of foreign affairs, Brissot was nonetheless a hugely important 
political figure, especially in the Diplomatic Committee of the National 
Convention. By his protests, he had blocked the nomination of Guil-
laume de Bonnecarrère as minister to the United States—a nomina-
tion that Lebrun had supported.107 And with the new minister of war, 
Pache, opposing the conduct of the war in Belgium, Lebrun could not 
103 Eugene Nelson White, “The French Revolution and the Politics of Government Finance, 
1770–1815,” Journal of Economic History 55 (1995): 241–42; Potofsky, “Political Economy,” 490–508.
104 Whatmore, “Commerce,” 362–64; White, “French Revolution,” 242. Howe argues that 
the decree “was not as brutally exploitive as often claimed” (Foreign Policy, 123).
105 Frank Moya Pons, “Haiti and Santo Domingo, 1790–c. 1870,” in From Independence to 
c. 1870, vol. 3 of The Cambridge History of Latin America, ed. Leslie Bethell (Cambridge, 1984), 
238–41; Dubois, Avengers, 130–51.
106 Perroud, J.-P. Brissot, 303–20.
107 Howe, “French Revolutionary Policy,” 498–500.
540 FRENCH HISTORICAL STUDIES
afford politically to ignore Brissot.108 Moreover, the bonds of friend-
ship between Girondin leaders gave Lebrun an additional incentive to 
appease Brissot.109
 Within this context, Lebrun seems to have been looking to advance 
France’s position in the European balance of power while minimizing 
French expenditures, especially in light of Brissot’s costly and some-
what fanciful plan for Spanish American conquest.110 Mountflorence’s 
proposal and the unsigned memorandum both presented a feasible 
alternative: a covert, self-sustaining operation that would neither tax 
French resources nor implicate France and its allies. Both treatises 
emphasized the ease with which a French emissary could recruit disaf-
fected western soldiers and capture New Orleans. French participation, 
at least initially, would be hidden; the affair would be guised as a local 
uprising. Any costs to France would be borne out of a renegotiated debt 
settlement with the United States.111 And as the unsigned memoran-
dum pointed out, the filibusters would force Spain to divert resources 
to protect the remainder of its colonial empire.112 Thus the plan would 
weaken Spain while minimizing the risk of escalation.
 Lebrun’s efforts to get British support for France’s transatlantic 
schemes further illustrate his acute interest in the European balance 
of power. In September, Lebrun had written to Chauvelin asking that 
he induce the British to attack Louisiana.113 Then in late November, 
Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, another French agent in Lon-
don, presented British prime minister William Pitt a report that sought 
joint French and British action against the Spanish colonies: “Another 
object of great importance, not only for France and England, but also 
108 For the details of this conflict, see Howard G. Brown, War, Revolution, and the Bureau-
cratic State: Politics and Army Administration in France, 1791–1799 (Oxford, 1995), 44–62; and Robert 
Heron, ed., Letters Which Passed between General Dumourier, and Pache, Minister at War to the French 
Republic, during the Campaign in the Netherlands, in 1792 (Perth, 1794).
109 See Linton, “Fatal Friendships,” 60–62. Dumouriez and Brissot were a notable excep-
tion, having had a strained relationship since the summer of 1792.
110 Some have argued that America was relatively unimportant to French leaders at the 
time. See, e.g., Elkins and McKitrick, Age of Federalism, 332; Alexander DeConde, Entangling Alli-
ance: Politics and Diplomacy under George Washington (Durham, NC, 1958), 204; and Paul Mantoux, 
“Le Comité de Salut public et la mission de Genet aux Etats-Unis,” Revue d’histoire moderne et contem-
poraine 13 (1909): 5–6. This article generally agrees with that conclusion. The Genet mission—as 
rationalized by Lebrun—was more a product of French goals on the European balance of power 
than of concern about America per se. Nevertheless, Lebrun had experience handling American 
affairs as the leader of the first bureau while Dumouriez was minister of foreign affairs.
111 Crandall, “Genet’s Projected Attack,” 23.
112 The unsigned memorandum includes a list titled “The Importance of Making a Diver-
sion in Louisiana.” The first item on that list is “to alarm Spain on the possession of its western 
Colonies, and to make use there of a part of their troops to protect new Mexico. Perhaps 10,000 
men would not be enough to secure this border, when Louisiana will be free.” See Turner, “Selec-
tions,” 2:946.
113 Lebrun to Chauvelin, Sept. 14, 1792, in Sorel, L’Europe et la Révolution française, 3:20.
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for their respective spheres,” Talleyrand wrote, “is the independence of 
the Spanish colonies in Peru, Mexico, etc.”114 The proposal, however, 
was short on details.
 Without more information, it is difficult to discern Lebrun’s inten-
tions in his dealings with Britain. Spain and England were allied, but 
Lebrun might have thought that he could get British support for covert 
attacks on Spanish colonies. This would have fit with his goal of mini-
mizing French expenditures, and it would have eliminated the threat of 
English retaliation. Lebrun also seems to have believed that Britain was 
on the precipice of its own revolution, and he may have thought that 
the mission could be part of broader cooperation between the coun-
tries, or that an expedition against the Spanish colonies would break 
the Spanish alliance and drain British resources.115
 Viewed in light of the Genet affair, however, Lebrun’s overtures 
may have been meant, at least in part, to convey that France’s actions 
against Spain’s colonies were not intended to be attacks on British inter-
ests and therefore should not warrant British retaliation. Talleyrand’s 
letter to Pitt stated that the proposed expedition “cannot be regarded 
as a violation of law, or rather a usurpation of the Spanish government, 
in light of Spain’s hostility to France, particularly during the unrest in 
Saint-Domingue, where Spain supported the black insurgents.”116 This 
justification for anti-Spanish intrigues was part of a proposal for British 
assistance, but it also may have been intended to discourage Britain 
from intervening on Spain’s behalf in the event of a solitary French 
scheme. While Brissot and Dumouriez were eager for conflict with 
England, Lebrun’s actions toward Britain demonstrated significant 
restraint and nuanced diplomacy.117
 In addition to promoting his geopolitical goals, Lebrun also used 
the Genet mission to defuse the emerging domestic dispute with Bris-
sot over the prospective Miranda expedition. By acting against Span-
ish Louisiana, Lebrun undercut much of the need for and urgency of 
Brissot’s more confrontational approach. Although Brissot continued 
114 There is probably more to know about this episode, but the best explanation (and the 
quotation from Talleyrand) appears in Dorigny, “Brissot et Miranda en 1792,” 102–3. A proposal 
by Admiral Armand-Gui-Simon de Coet-Nempren, comte de Kersaint written shortly after the 
Aug. 10 coup bears some similarity to this plan, although Kersaint proposed even broader inter-
national cooperation to overtake Spanish control of its colonies. See William S. Robertson, “Fran-
cisco de Miranda and the Revolutionizing of Spanish America,” in Annual Report of the American 
Historical Association for the Year 1907, 2 vols. (Washington, DC, 1908), 1:289–90.
115 A useful discussion of Lebrun’s attitudes toward Britain appears in Howe, French Foreign 
Policy, 131–45.
116 Quoted in Dorigny, “Brissot et Miranda en 1792,” 103.
117 For a reinterpretation of French motives in the Talleyrand mission, see Alan Sked, 
“Talleyrand and England, 1792–1838: A Reinterpretation,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 17 (2006): 
647–64.
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to push for broader action against Spain, his protestations lacked the 
force they had before the announcement of the Genet mission.118
 Scholars interpreting the Genet affair as the product of Brissot’s 
revolutionary zeal tend to emphasize Girondin ineptitude in foreign 
affairs. Elkins and McKitrick state that the Girondins’ “guide and coun-
selor in foreign relations was Jacques Pierre Brissot de Warville, whose 
preeminence seems to have depended largely on their ignorance.”119 
Ammon describes the Genet mission as characterized by “an air of 
flightiness.” The Girondins, he argues, “were constantly baffled that 
the reiteration of the platitudes of republicanism failed to solve the 
complex problems facing the nation.”120 In the end, of course, Genet’s 
western intrigues failed, and given the circumstances there is probably 
little chance they would have turned out otherwise. That failure, how-
ever, was not primarily the fault of French planning.
 Genet’s western intrigues faced numerous obstacles, most of which 
were unforeseeable by the French government. As such, the mission’s 
breakdown does not necessarily reflect ideological blindness or insuf-
ficient preparation. Once in Philadelphia, Genet was careless with his 
orders. In late August 1793 Spanish agents discovered an incendiary 
pamphlet that Genet had written. Addressed from “French freemen 
to their brothers in Louisiana,” Genet stated that “naval forces of the 
republicans in the western territory are ready to descend the Missis-
sippi River accompanied by a great number of French republicans who 
will come to your aid under the banners of France, all of which guar-
antees you complete success.”121 Spain protested to the Washington 
administration, which then wrote to Kentucky governor Isaac Shelby 
demanding that he “take those legal measures which shall be necessary 
to prevent any such enterprise,” reminding him that the affair could 
hamper American negotiations with Spain to open access to the Missis-
sippi River.122
 Further damaging Genet’s prospects was the unknown fact that 
Kentucky leader James Wilkinson was informing the Spanish governor 
at New Orleans, Baron Francisco Louis Hector de Carondelet, of recent 
developments in Kentucky. In reaction to Wilkinson’s alarms, Spain not 
118 There exists a significant body of international relations literature on the interplay 
between foreign policy and domestic politics. See, e.g., Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and 
Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42 (1988): 427–60; 
and Helen V. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations 
(Princeton, NJ, 1997).
119 Elkins and McKitrick, Age of Federalism, 331.
120 Ammon, Genet Mission, 13.
121 The pamphlet was included in Josef Ignacio de Viar and Josef de Jaudenes to Thomas 
Jefferson, Aug. 27, 1793, in Boyd et al., Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 26:771–74.
122 Thomas Jefferson to Isaac Shelby, Aug. 29, 1793, ibid., 26:785–86.
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only applied additional pressure on the U.S. government but also liber-
alized American portage rights and expanded its efforts to co-opt fron-
tier leaders.123 These moves helped undercut Clark’s recruiting. Given 
Kentuckians’ ubiquitous hostility to Spanish closures of the Mississippi 
River, it is understandable that French leaders overlooked the possi-
bility of Spanish double agents thwarting their plans.
 Possibly even more important to the scheme’s failure was its lack of 
funding. Without money to pay for materiel and salaries, Clark’s efforts 
eventually languished.124 During the preparations for the mission, 
French leaders believed they would continue to receive debt payments 
that they could use in part to fund the mission. When the United States 
suspended payments in 1793, Genet had insufficient resources to meet 
even the relatively modest four hundred thousand livres in estimated 
expenses.125 Clark and Genet also had little hope of support from the 
French government after the arrest of the Girondin ministers in June 
1793. Genet himself was recalled shortly thereafter.
 Despite Clark and Genet’s failure, Lebrun was remarkably well 
informed in designing such a distant and secretive mission. He had 
numerous firsthand accounts of discontent on the frontier, and his 
principal assistant was Otto, whom several scholars have noted was an 
experienced and astute observer of American affairs.126 The unsigned 
memorandum which Otto likely authored demonstrates detailed 
knowledge of the frontier leadership and its mercurial political attach-
ments. Without unforeseen obstacles, the outcome of Genet’s western 
intrigues might have been different. And even with the tremendous 
burdens he faced, Clark claimed that he could organize nearly two 
thousand soldiers by April 1794.127
Frequently oversimplified or even overlooked, decision making during 
the origin of the Genet affair illustrates the competing goals and out-
looks of French leaders. Brissot’s support for the Miranda expedition 
shows a leader with global ambitions but little appreciation for practi-
cal limitations. Dumouriez, on the other hand, was focused on his own 
activities in Europe and had little interest in transatlantic adventurism. 
123 Thomas Robson Hay and M. R. Werner, The Admirable Trumpeter: A Biography of James Wil-
kinson (Garden City, NY, 1941), 136–41.
124 John Rydjord, “The French Revolution and Mexico,” Hispanic American Historical Review 
9 (1929): 80–81.
125 This estimate comes from the unsigned memorandum.
126 O’Dwyer, “French Diplomat’s View,” 410; Sifton, “Otto’s Mémoire,” 626; Drew R. McCoy, 
“James Madison and Visions of American Nationality in the Confederation Period: A Regional 
Perspective,” in Beyond Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and American National Identity, ed. 
Richard Beeman, Stephen Botein, and Edward C. Carter II (Chapel Hill, NC, 1987), 240–41.
127 “George Rogers Clark to Genet, 1794,” American Historical Review 18 (1913): 780–83.
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His successful opposition to Brissot’s plans also demonstrates his influ-
ence within the Executive Council. Lebrun’s decision making was the 
most complex of the three leaders. He showed sustained interest in 
striking Spanish colonies, both through his representations to England 
and his development of the Genet mission. He also, however, seems to 
have used the Genet affair as a means of limiting French involvement 
in Spanish America. His plans were consistent with Brissot’s dreams of 
spreading the Revolution abroad, but they were much more restrained 
and pragmatic. Particularly, Lebrun was trying to minimize French 
expenditures and avert British intervention.
 Just before Genet departed France, the National Convention exe-
cuted Louis XVI and, by the time Genet reached the United States, 
France was at war with England and Spain. In April 1793 Dumouriez 
defected to the Allies, and soon thereafter the Montagnards seized 
power and arrested their Girondin adversaries. The rapid progression 
of these events and the Girondins’ foreign and domestic failures tend 
to obscure the possibility that history could have turned out differently. 
At a glance, the Girondins may seem to have been naive revolution-
aries, unified by Brissot’s idealistic dreams and eager to declare war 
on tyranny everywhere. But while the origin of the Genet affair lends 
some credibility to the picture of Brissot as a spirited visionary, it also 
illustrates that French decision making was neither monolithic nor par-
ticularly impractical. At least regarding the American west, the French 
Foreign Ministry was reasonably well informed, cognizant of its own 
limitations, and attentive to the European balance of power.
